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Not Quite ‘A New HOPE’—Privacy Issues Surrounding North 
Carolina’s New Opioid Prescription Monitoring Statute* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the time it takes you to read this article, someone in the United 
States will likely fatally overdose on opioids.1 Drug overdose deaths have 
risen dramatically over the last twenty-five years,2 prompting the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services to declare the opioid crisis a 
public health emergency.3 In response, states began creating prescription 
drug monitoring programs (“PDMPs”) to reduce overprescribing, both by 
helping prescribers make informed decisions and by helping law 
enforcement identify deviant prescribers and dispensers.4 As of 2017, all 
fifty states have enacted PDMPs,5 though the degree to which physicians 
are required to use the programs when prescribing opioids varies by state.6 
 
 *  © 2019 Darpan N. Patel. 
 1. See Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 
19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/YG9C-
7Q5D] (stating that more than 130 people die from opioid overdoses every day, or an interpolated 
rate of approximately one person every eleven minutes). 
 2. See Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June 
5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-
overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html [https://perma.cc/DA6D-B43F (dark archive)] 
(showing that drug overdose deaths have been steadily rising since 1990). 
 3. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emergency’ But 
Requests No Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/26/us/politics/trump-opioid-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/P2M2-F9VR (dark archive)] 
(“President Trump on Thursday directed the Department of Health and Human Services to 
declare the opioid crisis a public health emergency, taking long-anticipated action to address a 
rapidly escalating epidemic of drug use.”). 
 4. See John Matthew Butler, William C. Becker & Keith Humphreys, Big Data and the 
Opioid Crisis: Balancing Patient Privacy with Public Health, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 440 
(2018) (describing the increasing popularity of PDMPs as a tool to aggregate opioid prescription 
data: PDMPs enable physicians to better understand patients’ histories with controlled substances 
and make informed prescription decisions, and allow law enforcement agencies to identify 
prescribers with higher-than-average—potentially malfeasant—opioid prescription rates); see 
also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.055 (2019) (enumerating Florida’s PDMP); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 218A.202 (Westlaw through Chapter 201 of the 2019 Regular Session) (enumerating 
Kentucky’s PDMP); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37f-101, -201 (Westlaw through 2018 Third 
Special Session) (enumerating Utah’s PDMP). 
 5. Austin Huguelet, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Gets Long-Awaited Approval 
in Missouri Senate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/prescription-drug-monitoring-program-gets-long-awaited-approval-
in-missouri/article_5bc2ae1e-294f-5b49-8b52-203e7f0bc098.html [https://perma.cc/9RH3-F9LV] 
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In North Carolina, the rate of overdose deaths nearly doubled between 
2010 and 2018,7 with several counties reporting overdose death rates ten to 
nearly twenty times the national average.8 Responding to these types of 
trends in previous years, North Carolina established its own PDMP in 
2005, called the Controlled Substances Reporting System (“CSRS”), under 
the CSRS Act.9 As enacted, the purpose of the CSRS is to identify patients 
who are abusing opioids, reduce overall mortality rates from opioid misuse, 
and facilitate law enforcement investigation of illicit diversion of opioids.10 
Diversion here refers to illicit or medically unnecessary supply or use of 
controlled substances that are otherwise legal and medically necessary.11  
The CSRS is housed in the North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services and serves as a repository for prescriptions of controlled 
substances given to “ultimate users” by “dispensers.”12 An “ultimate user” 
is any person who lawfully obtains a controlled substance from a dispenser 
for use in his or her household.13 “Dispensers” provide controlled 
substances to “ultimate users” and are most typically pharmacists.14 The 
CSRS Act requires prescribers, typically physicians, to use the CSRS to 
look at a patient’s prescription history when deciding whether to prescribe 
 
(announcing the Missouri Senate’s passage of its own PDMP and indicating that it is the last state 
to do so). 
 6. PDMP Mandatory Query by Prescribers and Dispensers, PDMPASSIST.ORG (Jan. 2, 
2018), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Mandatory_Query_20180102.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A9L-
PZ4Z] (stating that forty states mandate PDMP use to some degree, and fourteen require both 
prescribers and dispensers to use PDMPs). 
 7. North Carolina Opioid Summary: Opioid-Related Overdose Deaths, NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE (Feb. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/opioid-summaries-by-state/north-carolina-
opioid-summary [https://perma.cc/2544-C96J] (“Since 2010, when the rate was 8.1 deaths per 
100,000 persons, the rate has almost doubled.”). 
 8. Forsyth, Guilford, Mecklenburg, and Wake counties report overdose death rates that are 
in gross excess of the national average of almost twenty-two deaths per 100,000 people. See 
North Carolina Drug Overdose Deaths, COUNTY HEALTH RANKINGS & ROADMAPS (2018), 
https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/north-carolina/2018/measure/factors/138/data 
[https://perma.cc/GUL8-KMMN]; Opioid Overdose Death Rates and All Drug Overdose Death 




 9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.70 to -113.71 (2017). 
 10. See id. § 90-113.71(b) (describing legislative purposes of the CSRS Act). 
 11. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, NORTH CAROLINA NEEDS TO 
STRENGTHEN ITS SYSTEM FOR MONITORING AND PREVENTING THE ABUSE OF PRESCRIBED 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 8 (2014), https://www.ncleg.net/PED/Reports/documents/
Rx/Rx_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8JH-2SPY]. 
 12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (describing the establishment and maintenance of the 
controlled substances reporting system). 
 13. Id. § 90-113.72(5). 
 14. Id. § 90-113.72(4).  
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a controlled substance to the patient.15 As of 2017, with the enactment of 
the Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention (STOP) Act, dispensers are now 
also subject to civil penalties if they fail to report prescription data to the 
CSRS.16 
One important aspect of the CSRS Act was the degree to which it 
limited law enforcement access to patient data in the CSRS. The statute 
declared that law enforcement could request data from the CSRS only for a 
“bona fide specific investigation” that is “related to the enforcement of 
laws governing licit drugs pursuant to a lawful court order specifically 
issued for that purpose.”17 Providing judicial oversight of law enforcement 
access to CSRS data is particularly important because the CSRS houses 
private medical information. 
More recently, in June 2018, North Carolina enacted the Heroin and 
Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act, which removed the 
requirement for a “lawful court order” to release patient prescription data to 
local law enforcement.18 While the HOPE Act does require that law 
enforcement officers only access information pursuant to investigations 
where there is a “reasonable, good-faith belief based on specific facts and 
circumstances,”19 individual officers can construe these standards 
differently and may be less likely to be as impartial as a judge when 
deciding whether there is legitimate basis for an investigation.  
The HOPE Act also attempted to balance concerns about patient 
health data privacy in several ways. First, it imposed specific penalties, 
including civil fines and a private right of action, on law enforcement 
officers who inappropriately disseminate patient prescription data accessed 
through the CSRS.20 Second, the HOPE Act required that law enforcement 
officers become “certified diversion investigators” before they can request 
 
 15. Id. § 90-113.74C(a) (“Prior to initially prescribing a targeted controlled substance to a 
patient, a practitioner shall review the information in the controlled substances reporting system 
. . . .”). 
 16. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 10, § 90-113.73, 2017 
N.C. Sess. Laws 684, 685, 690–91 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (2017)) 
(establishing “civil penalties for pharmacies that employ dispensers who improperly report 
information to the controlled substances reporting system (CSRS)”). 
 17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 18. Compare Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, 
§ 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28–30 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
113.74(c)(5a), (i)) (indicating that CSRS data can also be released to local law enforcement who 
are designated certified diversion investigators and meet other stated requirements but not 
requiring a court order), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (requiring a court order pursuant 
to the active investigation in order to release CSRS data). 
 19. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 29 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(7(a)). 
 20. See id. §§ 11.(a), 12, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27, 30 (LexisNexis) (to be 
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-113.74(k), -113.75(a), (b)). 
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prescription data.21 Certified diversion investigators are defined as 
“officer[s] affiliated with a qualified law enforcement agency”22 who pass 
the required “minimum standards” for “certification” under the statute.23  
Notwithstanding incorporation of these balancing measures, removing 
direct judicial oversight for police access to prescription data has led to an 
outcry from North Carolina lawmakers, constituents, health organizations, 
and civil liberties groups.24 Given the contentious nature of using patient 
prescription data for law enforcement purposes, it will be difficult to 
resolve this issue in such a way that all concerned parties are satisfied with 
the solution. 
In its current form, the HOPE Act permits law enforcement to access 
prescription data with little restraint. Given the significance of the privacy 
interests at stake, and the relative lack of evidence that PDMPs reduce 
opioid abuse, the North Carolina General Assembly should err on the side 
of protecting prescription data privacy and amend the HOPE Act 
accordingly. This analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth a 
framework to weigh tradeoffs between privacy imperatives in protecting 
autonomy and prosecutorial utility of PDMP prescription data. Part II 
explores privacy issues arising from elements of the HOPE Act’s statutory 
scheme. Part III aims to mitigate prescription data privacy concerns by 
proposing amendments that can be implemented even without reinstating 
the previous court order requirement. Finally, the Conclusion briefly 
 
 21. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)). 
 22. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 29 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. 90-113.74(i)(7)(a1)). 
 23. Id. §§ 11.(b), 13, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28–29, 31 (LexisNexis) (to be 
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-113.74(i)(1)(a), -113.74(7)(a1), -113.74E) (allowing release of 
CSRS data only to law enforcement who have passed the “minimum standards” necessary to 
become certified diversion investigators, which include training on opioid diversion methods, 
appropriate CSRS use to identify potential diversion, and basic data privacy). 
 24. Rashaan Ayesh, Police Access to Prescription Database Approved in the NC 
Legislature, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 15, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article213193544.html [https://perma.cc/6ZK9-296L (dark archive)] (“Many House 
members were supportive of the bill as a whole but criticized the component regarding law 
enforcement access to the Controlled Substance Reporting System.”); Julie Havlak, HOPE Act 
Heads to Governor But Civil Liberties Concerns Remain, CAROLINA J. (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/hope-act-heads-to-governor-but-civil-libertarian-
concerns-remain/ [https://perma.cc/2K9T-Y3XL] (indicating Fourth Amendment-based concerns 
from civil liberties groups and legislative officials due to lack of judicial oversight of the release 
of CSRS data); Taylor Knopf, New Opioid Bill Gets Support from Law Enforcement, Concern 
from Recovery Advocates, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/07/new-opioid-bill-gets-support-from-law-
enforcement-concern-from-recovery-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/8DQM-QGXP] (commenting 
on objections to the HOPE Act by advocacy groups such as the Addiction Professionals of NC, 
the NC SUD Federation, and the N.C. Harm Reduction Coalition). 
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recapitulates the main points from Parts II and III into a coherent map of 
proposed revisions to the HOPE Act. 
I.  WEIGHING DATA PRIVACY INTERESTS 
Individuals have a strong privacy interest in their own medical 
information. Patients have no control over the production or documentation 
of their medical history25 but must necessarily relinquish their personal 
health information in order to receive quality care.26 Additionally, patients 
do not control who collects or manages their data—these processes are 
legally enshrined.27 Given patients’ unique lack of control over their own 
medical data and the sensitive nature of that data, the law recognizes 
patients’ right to privacy over their medical data,28 to varying degrees, in 
nearly all countries.29 
Personal medical data is a metric approximation of our visceral selves 
and is accordingly among the most intimate of private information. 
Maintaining privacy over medical data is paramount because control over 
access to personal medical data prevents undue influence by employers, 
insurers, and other actors seeking to leverage medical data into 
discriminatory decisionmaking.30 Regulating access to personal medical 
information, therefore, promotes individual autonomy.31 While this interest 
in autonomy is not an overriding absolute, in cases where the public benefit 
of granting third-party access is not ascertainable, protecting autonomy 
should be afforded greater weight because the individual harms resulting 
from disclosure of personal data are substantial.32 Unauthorized disclosure 
 
 25. See Bonnie Kaplan, Patient Health Data Privacy 3 (Yale Inst. for Soc’y & Policy 
Studies, Working Paper No. 14-028, 2014) (stating that medical information is both generated 
and housed by institutions without the consent of individual patients). 
 26. Id. at 3 (indicating that if an individual seeks quality health care, they must share 
personal health information). 
 27. Id. (characterizing medical data as distinct from other data because its collection and 
storage is “legally mandated,” as opposed to simply incentivized privately for the provision of 
quality care). 
 28. Id. at 5 (“Because of its sensitive nature, separate laws and regulations govern privacy 
risks of medical records.”). 
 29. Id. at 10. 
 30. Joy L. Pritts, The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health Information 
4 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/
media/Files/Activity%20Files/Research/HIPAAandResearch/PrittsPrivacyFinalDraftweb.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/4CE6-KEUJ]. 
 31. See id. at 6. 
 32. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A 
Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1439, 1441–42 (2002) (“If the data, however, are disclosed in ways that are unlikely to 
achieve a strong public benefit, and the personal risks are high, individual interests in autonomy 
should prevail.”). 
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of medical data can result in personal consequences ranging from social 
ostracism to reducing an individual’s liklihood of pursuing medical 
treatment due to loss of trust in health care providers.33 Therefore, any 
potential public benefit must be weighed against the risk of unauthorized 
disclosure and intrusion on autonomy. Applying this framework, experts 
contend the law should prioritize patient autonomy if it is unclear whether 
the use of PDMPs yield a clear public benefit.34  
Importantly, an expansive review of numerous recent studies 
concludes it is unclear whether PDMPs are effective as a whole.35 While 
PDMPs have proven effective in certain situations, research suggests these 
successes are typically confined to a particular constellation of variables: a 
specific state or geographical area, a specific drug, or a specific PDMP 
operational structure.36 Variable-specific efficacy of PDMP use may make 
it difficult to determine the scope of utility even in those states where these 
programs have been situationally effective because it is potentially difficult 
to parse the effects of intersecting variables on opioid misuse. More 
generally, while PDMPs are sometimes effective at slowing increases in 
opioid misuse, they are not typically effective at decreasing the overall 
incidence of misuse.37 Additionally, in studies done before all states 
adopted PDMPs, opioid overdose mortality was not consistently lower in 
states that had instituted PDMPs.38 Since aggregate data suggests it is at 
best unclear whether PDMPs are effective, ambiguities should also be 
construed against PDMP utility. There is no presumptive public benefit of 
PDMP use—the benefit only exists if it can be unequivocally shown. 
 
 33. Id. at 1448 (“[Medical confidentiality] allows patients to feel comfortable divulging 
personal information that is often needed for accurate diagnoses and treatment. As explained 
above, unauthorized uses or disclosures may subject individuals to embarrassment, social stigma, 
and discrimination.”). 
 34. See id. at 1442.  
 35. Christopher A. Griggs, Scott G. Weiner & James A. Feldman, Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs: Examining Limitations and Future Approaches, XVI WESTERN J. 
EMERGENCY MED. 67, 67 (2015) (finding that it is hard to determine whether opioid overdose-
related death reduction is due to PDMPs, “laws limiting dispensing of medications,” or “overall 
prescriber awareness of the risks of opioids,” and further indicating that PDMPs have had mixed 
effects on opioid prescribing); Erin P. Finley et al., Evaluating the Impact of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program Implementation: A Scoping Review, 17 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., 2017, at 
4 (“[T]he extant literature reveals mixed findings about the impact of PDMPs as a tool for 
reducing misuse and diversion of controlled substances.”). 
 36. Finley et al., supra note 35, at 6 (noting that because the statutory characteristics and 
implementation of PDMPs vary considerably from state to state, pinpointing which specific 
features of any given PDMP are responsible for efficacy or the lack thereof is difficult). 
 37. Liza M. Reifler et al., Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State Trends in 
Opioid Abuse/Misuse?, 13 PAIN MED. 434, 434–42 (2012). 
 38. Finley et al., supra note 35, at 4 (reviewing studies on opioid use-related mortality and 
finding that there is “no clear pattern of reduced overdose mortality in PDMP states”). 
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In North Carolina, a recent study found the CSRS is heavily 
underutilized, with prescribers and dispensers only using the system six 
percent of the time a prescription is written or filled.39 Another study found 
that inability to account for key factors bearing on presence or absence of 
opioid misuse, such as idiosyncratic variations in prescribing practices, 
makes it difficult to determine efficacy, further confounding analysis of 
CSRS utility.40 Going forward, it may be easier to analyze CSRS utility 
since the STOP Act enacted a punitive statutory scheme enforcing 
dispenser reporting.41 As of yet, however, there is no evidence suggesting 
that mandating dispenser reporting is sufficient to make the CSRS effective. 
In summary, applying the PDMP public benefit framework to the 
expansion of law enforcement CSRS access, the law should prioritize 
prescription data privacy for two reasons. First, aggregate data suggests 
CSRS use does not significantly affect rates of opioid diversion. Second, 
ambiguities due to irregular prescriber reporting make it even more 
difficult to conclusively show CSRS efficacy. Taken together, it is unclear 
whether there is a cognizable public benefit from CSRS use by law 
enforcement that outweighs the harm to individuals resulting from 
disclosure of a patient’s medical information without the patient’s consent. 
II.  PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
Several features of the HOPE Act raise privacy concerns, in part due 
to the substance of the provisions and in part due to the interplay between 
different statutory sections. Part A examines two effects of the new 
statutory penalties under the HOPE Act. First, differences in applying these 
penalties create perverse incentives for law enforcement officers to solicit 
data directly from pharmacies as opposed to the CSRS. Second, even if this 
were not the case, the penalty system incentivizes counterproductive use of 
prescription data. Part B exposes gaps in coverage by the statutory 
penalties and analyzes unnecessarily restrictive language that could impede 
prosecution of future violators of the HOPE Act. 
 
 39. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, supra note 11, at 20. 
 40. See Christopher Ringwalt et al., The Use of a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program to 
Develop Algorithms to Identify Providers with Unusual Prescribing Practices for Controlled 
Substances, 36 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 287, 296 (2015) (finding that false positives and 
negatives are likely to occur because of differences in provider practices and incomplete data). 
 41. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 10, § 90-113.73, 2017 
N.C. Sess. Laws 690, 690–91 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.73 (2017)). 
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A. Privacy Issues Related to Direct Access to Pharmacy Records 
The HOPE Act allows certified diversion investigators (“CDIs”)42 to 
solicit prescription data directly from pharmacies.43 Allowing direct 
acquisition of pharmacy-derived individual prescription data rather than 
mandating access exclusively through the CSRS presents potentially 
perverse incentives for law enforcement to bypass the already limited 
privacy protections presented in the statutory scheme. This is particularly 
true given that the statute does not prescribe clear oversight mechanisms 
for prescription data solicited directly from pharmacies. 
Admittedly, it is not unusual for states to statutorily prescribe a right 
of inspection for administrative agencies to oversee pharmacy 
recordkeeping.44 Most states also allow enforcement officials to inspect 
pharmacy records for controlled substance regulation purposes.45 On the 
other hand, a 2014 survey found that fewer states allow local law 
enforcement officers to solicit prescription data directly from pharmacies 
without a court order.46 Nevertheless, acknowledging that a number of 
states do allow local law enforcement to access pharmacy prescription data 
without a court order,47 the HOPE Act’s similar grant of access does not, at 
first glance, seem indefensible.  
The vast majority of states, including North Carolina, also 
differentiate privacy of prescription data housed in PDMPs from pharmacy 
records48—there are less stringent guidelines for directly accessing 
prescription data from pharmacies than for prescription data in the CSRS.49 
 
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.  
 43. See Heroin and Opioid Enforcement and Prevention (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 8, 
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
107.1). 
 44. Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy Records and the Right to Privacy, NAT’L 
ALL. FOR MODEL DRUG LAWS 21 (Mar. 2014), https://namsdl.org/wp-
content/uploads/Prescription-Monitoring-Programs-Pharmacy-Records-and-the-Right-to-
Privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/K82F-YWWF] (finding that state PDMPs typically allow access but 
impose more stringent restrictions on law enforcement access to prescription records without a 
court order than do the respective state pharmacy statutes). 
 45. Id. (“Every state across the country requires that prescription records be kept by 
pharmacists, and most allow access to those records to certain officials without a warrant.”). 
 46. Id. at app. B (stating only twenty states allow law enforcement officers access to 
prescription records housed in pharmacies without a court order authorizing access: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, 
and Washington). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (showing side-by-side comparisons of distinct privacy requirements for pharmacy-
derived and PDMP-derived prescription data for all fifty states). 
 49. Compare Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, 
§ 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 90-113.74(i)(1(d)) (requiring the State Bureau of Investigation to review and approve law 
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Presumably, this is because prescription data taken directly from 
pharmacies must be collected incrementally by going from pharmacy to 
pharmacy.50 That process makes it more difficult for unauthorized or 
malicious users to quickly gain access to multiple patients’ records, 
especially when compared to PDMP use. 
The statutory scheme in the HOPE Act, however, potentially creates 
perverse incentives for CDIs to preferentially solicit prescription data 
directly from pharmacies rather than from the CSRS because of differences 
in statutorily and administratively defined punitive measures. The HOPE 
Act created new statutory penalties for unauthorized access to or disclosure 
of prescription data;51 however, the penalties only apply to prescription data 
in the CSRS.52 While the HOPE Act does enact a new section, section 90-
107.1, that prohibits CDIs from disclosing pharmacy-derived prescription 
data through channels not “allowed by law,”53 the Act does not 
affirmatively address unauthorized access.54 Moreover, while the HOPE 
Act clearly prohibits CDIs from improperly disclosing pharmacy-derived 
prescription data, the Act does not enumerate a statutory penalty for CDIs 
who do so.55  
Similarly, the extant statute allowing law enforcement to access 
pharmacy-derived prescription data prohibits improper disclosure of that 
data but does not set forth a statutory penalty.56 State regulatory agencies 
also have not promulgated administrative codes defining penalties for 
improper disclosure.57 Failure to expressly define statutory or 
administrative penalties for improper CDI disclosure of pharmacy-derived 
prescription data could perversely incentivize the use of section 90-107.1 as 
 
enforcement requests for access to prescription data in the CRS), with id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 23–24 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1) (omitting any 
requirement that law enforcement seek review or approval by the State Bureau of Investigation 
before accessing pharmacy-derived prescription data). 
 50. See, e.g., Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy Records and the Right to 
Privacy, supra note 44, at 21–22 (“Florida allows law enforcement to go from pharmacy to 
pharmacy and request and receive copies of patient prescriptions without a warrant, but does not 
allow law enforcement to have direct access to the prescription monitoring database or to receive 
information from the database without approval of the program manager . . . .”). 
 51. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 24 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 90-107.1(d)). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-107 (2017). 
 57. See generally 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 26F (Supp. 2019) (outlining regulations for 
controlled substances without dedicating any provisions to punitive measures for law enforcement 
officers that improperly disclose prescription data). 
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a less scrupulously regulated alternative to the CSRS. Data that would be 
otherwise inaccessible through the CSRS, due to improper purpose or lack 
of substantiation of need, could potentially be accessed by going directly to 
the pharmacies housing the data. 
Statutory oversight of pharmacy-derived prescription data is 
comparatively more limited than that over CSRS data, compounding the 
problem. While the HOPE Act prohibits CDIs from accessing CSRS data 
without a formal request to and approval by the State Bureau of 
Investigation,58 the Act institutes unfettered access to prescription data 
when requested directly from pharmacies.59 The State Bureau of 
Investigation does not prospectively review CDI access of pharmacy-
derived prescription data under section 90-107.1;60 rather, it only reviews 
reports of such data retrospectively through random audits.61 Because there 
is no prospective or request-based oversight, section 90-107.1 provides law 
enforcement officials a “backdoor” means to indiscriminately solicit 
prescription data from pharmacies in a geographic area for a named opioid-
diversion suspect even when a similar request to the CSRS might have 
been denied. 
Certainly, soliciting prescription data broadly from pharmacies in an 
area is somewhat difficult since specific individuals must be named in 
order to pursue a valid search.62 However, because there is no language 
limiting the scope of inquiry and no requirement of “probable cause” or a 
similarly stringent evidentiary threshold requisite for investigation, CDIs 
could feasibly search for a number of individuals in a broad geographical 
area. Conducting such ostensibly broad searches would still carry a risk to 
the law enforcement official given the random audits of prescription data 
accessed directly from pharmacies. Nevertheless, it creates a vehicle for 
law enforcement to engage in a cost-benefit analysis between overbroad 
solicitation of prescription data and punishment for potentially 
inappropriate searching—a decision calculus that forecasts potential abuses 
of police powers. 
 
 58. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 11.(b), 
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
113.74(i)(1)(d)) (mandating that “[t]he request has been reviewed and approved by the State 
Bureau of Investigation”). 
 59. See id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1(c)). 
 60. See id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-107.1(b)). 
 61. Id. § 8, 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 23 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 90.107(a)(5)). 
 62. Id. (requiring that the investigating CDI provide the “first name, last name, and date of 
birth” for individuals whose prescription data is sought). 
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Even taken in the light most favorable to the statute, wherein CDIs 
only request data from pharmacies for named opioid-diversion suspects in a 
particular geographic area, acquiring prescription data under section 90-
107.1 is at best inefficient because it requires CDIs to iteratively and 
indiscriminately inspect all the pharmacies in a given area. Other states 
have solved this problem. For example, Kentucky’s PDMP (called 
“KASPER”)63 is one of the most effective in the country.64 Over the last 
two decades, KASPER implementation has moved Kentucky from second-
highest to thirty-first in rate of nonmedical use of prescription painkillers.65 
Kentucky law enforcement officials have been able to use de-identified 
data from PDMPs to pinpoint hotspots and communities most at risk.66 This 
approach requires data directly from the PDMP and arguably relies on law 
enforcement officials not soliciting prescription data from individual 
pharmacies to avoid generating piecemeal and potentially misrepresentative 
data sets. By contrast, in addition to creating a backdoor channel for 
improper solicitation of prescription data, such access to North Carolina 
prescription data under section 90-107.1 also disincentivizes uses of the 
CSRS that might stand a greater chance of benefiting the mission of law 
enforcement officials. 
Although disavowal of the court order requirement for local law 
enforcement CSRS access does not disrupt the traditional dynamic of lesser 
protections afforded to pharmacy-derived prescription data, the HOPE 
Act’s dissimilar statutory penalty schemes for these two vehicles of access 
facilitate abuses of police powers. Explicit statutory penalties (or regulatory 
penalties promulgated by the State Bureau of Investigation) for CDIs who 
improperly disclose pharmacy-derived prescription data would help address 
this issue. 
 
 63. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.202 (Westlaw through Chapter 201 of the 2019 
Regular Session) (laying out Kentucky’s “[e]lectronic system for monitoring controlled 
substances”). 
 64. See Pennsylvania Looks to Upgrade Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, INST. FOR 
RES., EDUC. & TRAINING IN ADDICTIONS (June 21, 2013), 
https://ireta.org/resources/pennsylvania-looks-to-upgrade-prescription-drug-monitoring-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/VQP8-WNS4] (indicating that Kentucky’s PMDP is considered a “gold 
standard”). 
 65. Id. (“Kentucky has seen its ranking among states with the highest nonmedical use of 
prescription painkillers drop from second to thirty-first place, reflecting a drop that officials 
attribute largely to its monitoring program.”). 
 66. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A Guide For Healthcare Providers, 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 1, 6 (2017), 
https://store.samhsa.gov/system/files/sma16-4997.pdf [https://perma.cc/D63B-X2EU] (indicating 
that state departmental health officials can use de-identified aggregate PDMP data to determine 
which communities present the greatest need for, and the opportunity for greatest benefit from, 
opioid treatment and prevention programs). 
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B. Ineffective Language Hamstrings CSRS-Related Penalties 
The HOPE Act establishes a penalty for indirectly accessing CSRS 
data that is inadequate to protect against potential abuse of police powers. 
A recent case from the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Brumley v. City of 
Cleveland (“Brumley II”),67 illustrates the gap in the law. In Brumley II, 
two members of a regional drug task force approached the plaintiff, Police 
Officer Brumley, with suspicions that the task force director “might be 
abusing prescription medications.”68 In an unrelated judicial proceeding, 
the presiding judge informed Officer Brumley that the task force director 
“appeared to be under the influence” while in chambers.69 Officer Brumley 
subsequently asked his neighbor, a pharmacist, to look up the task force 
director’s prescription drug history in the state PDMP.70 Officer Brumley 
found no evidence of prescription abuse.71 More importantly, he was 
subsequently terminated, in part because he violated state law and 
departmental policy by soliciting PDMP data prior to opening an active 
investigation pursuant to the matter.72 However, after affirming the trial 
court’s ruling of summary judgment against Officer Brumley,73 the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Brumley III, ultimately reversed the grant 
of summary judgment against Officer Brumley on grounds that there was a 
genuine question of fact as to whether the city legally terminated him.74 As 
part of its analysis, the court considered testimony of other officers in the 
department (previously rejected as inadmissible in lower court 
proceedings) about how case facts are often examined preliminarily before 
opening an active investigation.75 
 
 67. No. E2012-00002-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1737860 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter Brumley II]. 
 68. Id. at *1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at *2. 
 73. Id. at *2, *7. 
 74. No. E2014-02213-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 6000551, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 
2015) [hereinafter Brumley III] (“Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 
as we are constrained to do, we conclude that there was material evidence from which the trier of 
fact could conclude that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated solely for his refusal to remain 
silent about Chief Snyder’s alleged illegal actions. Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the complaint at this point in the proceedings because material questions 
of fact remained.”). 
 75. Id. at *2 (referring to testimony of another officer in the department who stated “that it 
was not common practice for officers to open a case file and inform their superior officers of 
criminal investigations that are in the early preliminary stage”). 
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This is disconcerting—Tennessee’s confidentiality provisions at the 
time of Brumley required a case number for PDMP use,76 as is currently 
true in North Carolina.77 Despite soliciting a pharmacist in order to 
circuitously access PDMP data without a case number, Officer Brumley’s 
actions, hypothetically, might have been permissible had there been a 
strong enough case that he was acting in accordance with local law 
enforcement regulations. This case raises two further concerns. First, 
administrative codes or departmental policies should be promulgated by 
local law enforcement departments to ensure safeguards under the HOPE 
Act are effective. Second, statutory felonies for CDIs who access or 
disclose prescription data “from the system for a purpose not authorized”78 
may be insufficient in scope to adequately protect patient privacy. 
Departmental codes would help curb the risk of CDIs improperly 
accessing or disclosing prescription data. Although the court in Brumley III 
did not find dispositive the expert testimony regarding divergent 
procedures for initiating investigations, at minimum the court indicated 
such evidence should be considered.79 If police officers are allowed to raise 
such de facto defenses to statutorily or departmentally prescribed processes 
designed to protect citizens’ privacy interests, the department protocols 
should be explicitly written to avoid usurping legislative intent.  
This is no mere question of administration, thus little deference need 
be given to the departments. Whether officers adhere to the requirement for 
an active case investigation before using the CSRS, or solicit pharmacists 
to access CSRS data and circumvent statutory privacy protections, is a 
question that lies at the heart of the statute. Additionally, since 
departmental officials are best poised to directly oversee the actions of 
CDIs, it is prudent to empower departmental policies to facilitate oversight. 
Therefore, local law enforcement should take extraordinary care to ensure 
that their departmental protocols are clearly defined and reflect the 
processes and privacy safeguards reflected in the statute. 
Expanding the scope of statutory protections against improper access 
or disclosure of prescription information is equally important. Statutory 
 
 76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-306(b) (Westlaw through the 2019 First Reg. Sess.) (“When 
requesting information from the database, law enforcement personnel shall provide a case number 
as part of the process for requesting information from the database. The case number entered shall 
correspond with an official investigation involving controlled substances and information 
requested should directly relate to the investigation.”). 
 77. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 11.(b), 
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 30 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
113.74(j)(2)(a)). 
 78. Id. § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. 90-113.74(k)(2)). 
 79. See Brumley III, 2015 WL 6000551, at *2. 
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penalties created under section 90-113.74(k) of the HOPE Act apply 
primarily to accessing data “from the [CSRS]” for a “purpose not 
authorized by [section 90-113.74].”80 Under section 90-113.74, the relevant 
permissible statutory purpose is “for investigative or evidentiary purposes 
related to violations of State or federal law.”81 This specified purpose may 
be overbroad—CDIs can investigate any case rationally related to a 
concern about controlled substance issues without violating the statute. 
Although there are some protections for confidentiality of prescription data 
built into extant legislation,82 there is little recourse for unsavory methods 
used to acquire information. 
Furthermore, the only portion of section 90-113.74 criminalizing 
indirect access to prescription information in the CSRS requires that the 
individual have “willfully and maliciously obtain[ed], disclose[d], or 
disseminate[d] prescription information . . . and with the intent to use such 
information for commercial advantage or personal gain, or to maliciously 
harm any person.”83 Because of the conjunctive “and” in the statute, willful 
and malicious actions can only be prosecuted under the statute if they also 
involve use of prescription information for “commercial advantage,” 
“personal gain,” or to “maliciously harm.”84 However, delimiting potential 
“willfully and maliciously” taken actions to these three categories shackles 
the statute’s ability to safeguard against impropriety outside of this 
narrowly defined scope. In fact, other North Carolina statutes felonizing 
willful or malicious actions typically do not exhibit such extensive 
conditioning of the mental state,85 possibly to provide prosecutorial 
flexibility in bringing a case forward. All penalties under section 90-113.74 
are already detrimentally limited to “purpose[s] not authorized”86 by the 
statute. Further restricting the scope of punishable actions taken “willfully 
 
 80. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(a) (2017) (“[E]xcept as otherwise provided below [CSRS 
data] may only be used (i) for investigative or evidentiary purposes related to violations of State 
or federal law . . . .”). 
 82. See id. (stating that “prescription information shall not be disclosed or disseminated to 
any person or entity by any person or entity authorized to review prescription information,” but 
failing to describe any statutory penalty if this provision is violated). 
 83. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 27 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)(3)) (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-49 (2017) (declaring that “[a]ny person who willfully 
and maliciously injures another by the use of any explosive or incendiary device or material is 
guilty of a Class D felony” but not including language further delimiting the mental state); id. 
§ 14-163 (“If any person shall willfully and unlawfully poison any horse, mule, hog, sheep or 
other livestock, the property of another, such person shall be punished as a Class I felon.”). 
 86. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. at 27 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)). 
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and maliciously” unduly weakens statutory safeguards against improper 
CDI use of CSRS prescription data. 
III.  AMENDING THE HOPE ACT TO SAFEGUARD PRIVACY 
Amending the HOPE Act can facilitate safeguarding of prescription 
data privacy, even without reimplementing the previous court order 
requirement. In this section, I propose two amendments to accomplish this 
goal. First, the North Carolina General Assembly should import existing 
language from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”) to restrict the scope of CSRS information given to law 
enforcement officials to the scope canonically applied to the same context 
under HIPAA. Second, it should enumerate a statutory right to patient 
revision of prescription drug records in the CSRS. 
A. Limiting the Scope of Accessed Information 
While the HOPE Act does require the State Bureau of Investigation to 
approve CDI requests to access CSRS data,87 the Act would benefit from 
language limiting the scope and nature of the requested information. In 
particular, the Act lacks language restricting access to unrelated patient 
information or limiting the scope of prescription data to immediate needs of 
an “active investigation.”88 Instead, the HOPE Act relies on a punitive 
statutory scheme to deter inappropriately expansive sweeps of patient 
prescription and personal data.89 As indicated in Part II, there are numerous 
issues surrounding the scope of implementation of these provisions and 
their ability to safeguard privacy interests.90 Therefore, restricting 
information access at the outset is more likely to be effective than relying 
on punitive measures to deter indiscriminate access to medication data. 
Nearly half of the North Carolina House of Representatives similarly 
wanted to restrict initial data access; their opinion was made apparent 
during final debate on the HOPE Act.91 Representative Robert Reives (D-
Sanford) proposed an amendment that would require local law enforcement 
 
 87. Id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)(d)). 
 88. The requirement that the request be “reasonably related to a bona fide active 
investigation” only relates to the relevance of the requested information, not the type of personal 
data or the scope of prescription data to be granted. See id. § 11.(b), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. at 28 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(i)(1)(c)). 
 89. See id. § 11.(a), 2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 27 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(k)). 
 90. See supra Section II.A. 
 91. See S.B. 616, amend. A5, Gen. Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. (N.C. 2018) (amending § 90-
113.74(i) to include a “court order” requirement for CDI access to the CSRS, but failing to pass 
the North Carolina Senate on a 48-55 vote). 
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to obtain a court order before accessing prescription data, as had been the 
case under the STOP Act, but the amendment narrowly failed to pass with 
a vote of forty-eight in favor and fifty-five against.92 Support for the 
amendment largely fell along party lines but did include several Republican 
members like Representative Michael Speciale (R-New Bern), who pointed 
out that “[t]he issue is not whether this bill is needed . . . but [that] it 
oversteps itself when it allows the government to look at private records 
without a warrant.”93 Similarly, Representative David Rogers (R-
Rutherfordton) pointed out that removal of the requirement for a warrant or 
court order is problematic because the “reasonable, good faith” standard is 
ambiguous, and “what to one officer may be reasonable, to a judge is 
completely unreasonable.”94 Pushback against the amendment focused 
primarily on the need for a prompt response to law enforcement requests 
for data access, with Representative Gregory Murphy (R-Greenville) and 
others emphasizing the need to act quickly, contending that under current 
law “it takes five to seven days to get a judge to sign off on something.”95 
As it stands, the HOPE Act prioritizes the perceived need for a prompt 
response over ensuring law enforcement officials do not access more 
prescription data than is reasonably needed for an active investigation. This 
is particularly problematic given the lack of compelling evidence showing 
that PDMPs are effective at reducing opioid diversion rates, as discussed in 
Part I. Under the framework established in Part I, requiring a court order 
for access to prescription data, as was the standard under the CSRS and 
STOP acts,96 would be the ideal safeguard to protect data privacy, and 
therefore patient autonomy. The General Assembly could look to other 
states, most recently Utah, that have reverted from a warrantless standard to 
a “court order” standard without issue.97 
If reverting to a “court order” standard remains politically intractable, 
however, consensus might more easily be leveraged to incorporate 
unambiguous language limiting dissemination of medication data to what is 
reasonably necessary for pursuing the active investigation. This is not 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Taylor Knopf, Debate Over New Opioid Bill Dragged on Through the Night, N.C. 
HEALTH NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/14/debate-
over-hope-act-dragged-on-through-the-night/ [https://perma.cc/693M-Y2R5]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c)(5) (2017); see Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention 
Act of 2017, ch. 74, sec. 11, § 90-113.74, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 684, 691–92 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74 (2017)) (leaving § 90-113.74(c)(5) unaltered). 
 97. Want to Use Utah’s Drug Database? Get a Warrant, STANDARD-EXAMINER (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://www.standard.net/opinion/our-view/want-to-use-utah-s-drug-database-get-a-
warrant/article_25b07725-68e3-58ed-8f90-ae357e718ddf.html [https://perma.cc/6NYM-CXB8]. 
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unprecedented. HIPAA, the federal statute regulating privacy of protected 
health information, specifically addresses the appropriate scope of medical 
data to be released to law enforcement.98 Under HIPAA, releasing medical 
data to law enforcement without a court order requires a showing that: (1) 
“[t]he information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law 
enforcement inquiry”; (2) “[t]he request is specific and limited in scope to 
the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which the 
information is sought”; and (3) “[d]e-identified information could not 
reasonably be used.”99 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
has further validated this standard in administrative documents produced by 
the agency.100 
Adopting HIPAA standards to limit the scope of prescription data 
available for an active investigation does not violate statutory intent. Under 
the HOPE Act, CDIs must be certified by undergoing training on a variety 
of topics related to drug diversion and prescription data; among other 
requirements, the statute expressly includes “[d]ata privacy and security 
provisions of [HIPAA] and other pertinent federal and State laws 
governing privacy and security of confidential data and records.”101 
Although law enforcement is not itself a “covered entity” bound by 
HIPAA,102 inclusion of HIPAA privacy provisions in mandatory training 
for CDIs suggests statutory intent to adhere to the framework of HIPAA 
protection of medical information. 
Other states have taken similar stances.103 For example, Delaware’s 
PDMP statute delimits the scope of PDMP information available to law 
enforcement using language essentially identical to that in HIPAA.104 
Access to PDMP data may be granted to law enforcement officials 
“provided that such information be relevant and material to such 
investigation, limited in scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light 
 
 98. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) (2018). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide 
for Law Enforcement, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 2, 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/final_
hipaa_guide_law_enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FMK-6NWZ]. 
 101. Heroin and Opioid Prevention and Enforcement (HOPE) Act of 2018, ch. 44, § 14.(b), 
2018-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21, 32 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17E-
4(a)(14)(g)). 
 102. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). 
 103. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4798(l)(2)(d) (Supp. 9 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1007(F)(3) (Westlaw through 2018 Third Extraordinary Session) (allowing release of PDMP 
data without a court order if requirements identical to those enumerated under HIPAA in 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C) are met). 
 104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4798(l)(2)(d). 
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of the purpose for which the information is sought, and include identifying 
information only upon a showing of need.”105 
Incorporating similar language in the HOPE Act would help alleviate 
the concerns of lawmakers like Representative Rogers that ambiguous 
“good faith” standards requiring the prescription data be “reasonably 
related” to the investigation create an unworkable standard for even 
conscientious law enforcement officials.106 Using specific language would 
directly restrict inappropriate prescription data access, rather than 
proximately relying on deterrence from laws punishing improper use of the 
data. Moreover, incorporating this type of language into the statute would 
not change the process proposed by the HOPE Act, so it would not 
sacrifice any expedience prioritized by the law. While restoring a court 
order requirement would be the ideal solution to protect data privacy, 
unambiguous statutory language limiting type and scope of medication data 
accessed would provide some privacy safeguards and has a better chance of 
generating consensus in the North Carolina General Assembly. 
B. Allowing Revision of Personal CSRS Records 
Because HIPAA regulations do not bind the CSRS, state law should 
explicitly prescribe privacy protections for CSRS data, including the right 
for individuals to amend their CSRS records. HIPAA applies to “covered 
entit[ies]”—consisting of health plans, health care providers, and health 
care clearinghouses—and their “business associate[s].”107 Prescribers and 
pharmacists are HIPAA-covered entities, so inputting prescription data into 
the CSRS is subject to HIPAA regulation.108 However, the CSRS itself is 
neither a HIPAA “covered entity” nor a related “business associate,” so 
once CSRS data is entered into the system, it is no longer subject to HIPAA 
regulation.109 State governments are, however, free to enumerate “privacy 
and security requirements” under state law.110 Therefore, the General 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Knopf, supra note 93. 
 107. 45 C.F.R § 160.103. 
 108. LISA N. SACCO, JOHNATHAN H. DUFF & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42593, PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 27 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42593.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9B7-8XN2] (“PDMPs also receive 
protected health information (PHI) from pharmacists and other health care providers (HIPAA 
covered entities) who are subject to the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule.”). 
 109. Id. at 28 (“A PDMP is not a HIPAA covered entity, nor is it generally a business 
associate[, so] . . . the HIPAA requirements and standards for maintaining the security and 
privacy of the [protected health information] . . . that apply to HIPAA covered entities would not 
apply to PDMPs.”). 
 110. Id. (“Although HIPAA may not apply, privacy and security requirements for PDMPs are 
still enumerated under state law.”). 
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Assembly has not only the privilege, but the prerogative to enact privacy 
protections for CSRS data. 
Although CSRS data is not subject to HIPAA regulation, explicit 
references to HIPAA in mandatory CDI trainings suggest statutory intent to 
comport to HIPAA standards,111 including the right for patients to revise 
mistakes in their prescription histories. Under HIPAA, patients have a 
“right to . . . amend protected health information or a record about the 
individual.”112 The entity housing the protected health information reserves 
the right to deny the revision request if the records are accurate,113 and there 
are also relevant exceptions, such as prohibiting revision of records that are 
under investigation for criminal activity.114 By carving out important 
exceptions while allowing requests to amend patient medical records, 
HIPAA evenly balances governmental (particularly prosecutorial) and 
private interests regarding the right to revise protected health information. 
Not allowing patients the right to revise potential mistakes in CSRS 
data, particularly when patients do not get a choice as to whether their data 
is included in the CSRS,115 heavily impinges on patient autonomy. Under 
North Carolina law, patients are allowed to view their records in the 
CSRS,116 but there is no statutory or administrative grant of a right to 
amend.117 The right to amend is particularly important because merely 
being “under investigation” for opioid misuse can irrevocably impact lives, 
even if individuals under investigation are later exonerated.118 Given the 
 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05. 
 112. 45 C.F.R § 164.526(a)(1) (2018). 
 113. Id. § 164.526(a)(2) (“A covered entity may deny an individual’s request for amendment, 
if it determines that the protected health information or record . . . [i]s accurate and complete.”). 
 114. Id. § 164.524(a)(1) (“[A]n individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of 
protected health information about the individual . . . except for . . . [i]nformation compiled in 
reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or 
proceeding.”). 
 115. Strengthen Opioid Misuse Prevention Act of 2017, ch. 74, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 684, 
685 (mandating reporting of prescription data by prescribers and dispensers). 
 116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.74(c) (2017) (“The Department shall release data in the 
controlled substances reporting system to . . . [a]n individual who requests the individual’s own 
controlled substances reporting system information.”). 
 117. While prescribers have the right to correct their prescribing history, nowhere is it written 
that patients have a right to correct their prescription history. See NC Controlled Substance 
Reporting System (CSRS), N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.ncdhhs.gov/divisions/mhddsas/ncdcu/csrs [https://perma.cc/QX4Y-P7Q3]. 
Additionally, the patient form for requesting CSRS data does not include any reference to an 
amendment or correction process. See Request for Individual’s Own Controlled Substances 
Reporting System Information, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://files.nc.gov/ncdhhs/documents/files/csrs-individualreq10-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCA2-
NGF3] (last updated June 2010). 
 118. Mark Greenblatt & Angela M. Hill, Exclusive Investigation: Your Prescriptions Aren’t 
Private, WCPO CINCINNATI (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.wcpo.com/longform/so-you-think-
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devastating effects of an investigation predicated on faulty information, and 
since HIPAA standards prevent the amendment process from impeding law 
enforcement activities, the balance of equities between privacy and 
prosecutorial utility favors explicitly importing the HIPAA “right to 
amendment” for CSRS data. 
CONCLUSION 
While addressing the opioid crisis is of utmost importance, doing so 
need not come at the cost of individual privacy, particularly by sacrificing 
privacy of medical information. As it stands, the HOPE Act presents risk of 
serious harms to individual privacy. While the HOPE Act was designed to 
facilitate the investigative process by allowing law enforcement officers to 
access CSRS data without a court order, analysis of PDMP programs at 
large shows it is unclear whether PDMPs are effective. Given the 
inconclusive evidence of their efficacy, and the lack of evidence that the 
statutory regime in the HOPE Act would make the CSRS more effective, 
protecting privacy of prescription data should accordingly be granted 
greater weight, particularly since the harms of disclosing private medical 
information without consent are well established.119 
Amending the HOPE Act can significantly improve prescription data 
privacy. While reinstating the court order requirement for accessing the 
CSRS would provide the most protection of privacy, several alternative 
amendments could at least partially protect privacy interests. First, the 
General Assembly should establish clear statutory penalties for improper 
use of pharmacy-derived prescription data, and local law enforcement 
agencies should establish regulatory penalties to the same end. Second, the 
General Assembly should expand the scope of felonies created to deter 
inappropriate use of CSRS data or remove overly constraining language 
defining the mental state requirements for these felonies. Third, the General 
Assembly should adopt HIPAA standards requiring that CSRS data 
accessed pursuant to an active investigation is only shared to the extent 
reasonably necessary to aid the enforcement efforts. Fourth, the General 
Assembly should adopt HIPAA standards allowing patients to amend any 
inaccuracies in their prescription history. The General Assembly adopting 
these measures would go a long way towards restoring faith in the North 
Carolina government’s management of sensitive data that, perhaps more 
than any other, lies at the heart of who we are as individuals. 
 
prescriptions-are-private [https://perma.cc/39AK-KAGD] (finding that an investigation based on 
faulty evidence delayed a couple from adopting a child and nearly resulted in termination of both 
suspects’ employment in the city fire department). 
 119. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 32, at 1142. 
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